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Government Entanglement With
Religion: What Degree Of Proof Is
Required?

LEE BOOTHBY*

Religious freedom is a fundamental right entitled to preferential treatment. The Supreme Court, in recognizing this, has imposed a stiff test on
governmental action impinging on this right, the government must show a
compelling state interest and that the means used in implementing its policies are the least intrusive possible. However the court has not yet discussed the degree of proof required of the state in establishing these
factors. The author suggests that in light of the preferentialposition of religiousfreedom and its social impact, the standardof proof should be that
of clear and convincing evidence. While the general standardfor civil litigation is preponderance of the evidence, a more demanding standard is
calledfor when restrictionon liberty interests are involved. Selection of a
standardof proof turns on the constitutional acceptability of an erroneous
decision. The author analogizes such similarinterests as denaturalization,
civil commitments, deportation,discrimination,andfree speech as lending
support to his propositionsince they are currently protected by the higher
standard. He concludes that the same protection should be extended to
freedom of religion.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The right to practice one's own religion without interference
* Undergraduate work, Andrews University; J.D., Wayne State University,
1957; General Counsel for Americans United for Separation of Church and State
Fund. Mr. Boothby has been involved in church-state conflict cases for ten years
and is a recognized authority on the free exercise clause of the first amendment.

has long been recognized as a cherished and fundamental right.
Indeed, the first sentence of our Bill of Rights prohibits Congress
from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting its free exercise.'
It is basic that the free exercise of religion occupies a fundamental and preferred position. 2 As Professor Kauper stated: "Of
all the constitutional guarantees, the protection of religious liberty has been the most exalted." 3 Chief Justice Burger, in referring to the preferential position of the first amendment, recently
stated that "[t]he values enshrined in the First Amendment
plainly rank high 'in the scales of our national values.' "4
In spite of the Court's repeated assertions revering the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment, the individuals who laid
claim to these rights rarely prevailed against the government
prior to 1963.
In fact, the 1961 United States Supreme Court decision in
Braunfeld v. Brown held that where a state regulation infringed
on a "free exercise" right, the Court need only determine if the
purpose and effect of the state regulation in question is to advance the state's secular goals.5 In 1963, however, a major shift in
policy was evidenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert
v. Verner.6 The Court in Sherbert, while not specifically overruling its earlier decisions, nonetheless significantly affected the application of those decisions by placing upon the state certain
specific burdens of proof in cases involving the free exercise of religion.
II. THE

SHERBERT TEST

In Sherbert, Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job because her religious beliefs would not permit her to work on Saturday. Sherbert found it
impossible to locate other employment which did not demand
secular Saturday employment. She subsequently filed a claim for
unemployment compensation benefits. The state denied her
claim, determining that she was not entitled to benefits because
she had not made herself available for suitable work when offered
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d
995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sharp v. Segler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969); State v. Yoder, 49
Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
3. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONsTrruTIoN 19 (1964).
4. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
5. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
6. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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by the state employment office. 7
Justice Brennan, deviating significantly from the Court's earlier
ruling in Braunfeld, wrote that "[oI nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."8
In Sherbert, the Court, in weighing the competing interests, established the proper three-part test to be used in free exercise
cases:
1. Whether there was a burden imposed on the exercise of religion, 9
2. Where such a burden was found, whether the infringement was justified by a compelling governmental interest, 10
3. And, where a compelling governmental interest had been shown to exist, whether there was any less intrusive alternate means available to
meet the state's objective. 1 1

The Court made clear that every governmental interest would not
overbalance a free exercise claim. The interest must be shown to
12
involve a grave and paramount state concern.
The most important change in the Court's thinking in this area
was most certainly the placement of a burden on the state to establish: 1) that there was a compelling governmental interest involving a paramount state interest and 2) the absence of any less
intrusive means whereby the state may carry out any such vital
state objective.
The "least intrusive alternative" aspect of the Sherbert test was
not a new first amendment concept. It had been previously enunciated in Shelton v. Tucker,13 where the Court struck down a state
statute requiring teachers to file affidavits listing the organizations to which they belonged. In Shelton, the Court held that
even though the governmental purpose may have been legitimate
and substantial, that purpose could not be attained by a means
that infringed upon fundamental personal liberties if a less intrusive method of shifting means was available. The Court stated
that "[tjhe breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in
7. Id. at 401.
8. Id. at 406 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
9. 374 U.S. at 403.
10. Id. at 406.
11. Id. at 407. Although the Sherbert test was first applied within the context
of a free exercise situation, it has also been applied to a variety of other first
amendment issues; see Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 597, 605 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Heilberg v. Fixa,
236 F. Supp. 405, 408 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
12. Id. at 405.
13. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."14
One of the most significant post-Sherbert decisions is Wisconsin
v. Yoder.15 In this case, the Supreme Court, citing Sherbert, held
that there must be a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override an individual claim to protection under the Free Exercise
Clause: "The essence of all that has been said and written on the
subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion."16
In Yoder, the Court upheld the right of Amish parents to remove teenage children from the public schools and held the provisions of the state's compulsory education laws, as applied to
members of the Amish religion who had graduated from the
eighth grade, to be unconstitutional.
Even though the Yoder Court found that the state had a substantial interest in education generally, it sustained the holding of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court which ruled that "[a] compelling
interest is not just a general interest in the subject matter but the
need to apply the regulation without exception to attain the pur7
poses and objectives of the legislation."'
The Sherbert test, as seen in Yoder, remains one of continuing
vitality,18 and its possible application in instances of governmental intrusion into church institutionalaffairs poses an interesting
question.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE SHERBERT TEST TO GOVERNMENTAL
INTRUSION INTO CHURCH INSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

There is currently a substantial fear among many church leaders that state and federal governments are devising new and varied means to determine the particular purposes of individual
churches and to define what is secular and what is religious.
Moreover, the fear exists among these church leaders that government is attempting to thrust itself into purely ecclesiastical
concerns.
A recent example of government activity which provokes such
fears involved an attempt by the National Labor Relations Board
to assert jurisdiction over Roman Catholic lay teachers. 19 Other
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 488.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 215.
State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 438, 182 N.W.2d 539, 542 (1972).
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAw, 851-65 (1978).
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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examples include labor department directives requiring states to
include church operated schools within its unemployment compensation program 20 and legislation applying restrictions and disclosure provisions to churches in their fund solicitation
21
programs.
In the recent case of Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets,22 the
Department of Consumer Affairs of Puerto Rico, in accordance
with its mandate to restrain inflationary trends, launched an investigation of the costs of private schools, including those operated by the Roman Catholic Church. The government subpoened
detailed financial records from the Catholic schools. The Inter-Diocesan Secretariat for Catholic Education of Puerto Rico and
school superintendants refused to comply and brought suit. The
plaintiffs sought to have the Secretary permanently enjoined from
"interfering, meddling, or entangling with or in the financial affairs of the Roman Catholic Church."23
Presiding Judge Coffin, writing the court's opinion in Surinach,
stated that the Commonwealth had "failed to shoulder its substantial burden of justifying" its encroachment into church affairs. 24 In Surinach, the court applied the Sherbert test to a case
where the claimed conflict with first amendment rights involved
the church as a corporate body, and not just the free exercise
claim of an individual. Significantly, it applied this test not only
to free exercise claims but also to claims of state entanglement.
The court stated:
Given our conclusion that the Secretary's demands for financial data of
these schools both burden the free exercise of religion and pose a threat
of entanglement between the affairs of the church and state, the Commonwealth must show that 'some compelling state interest' justifies that burden, and that there exists no less restrictive or entangling alternative.
This demanding level of scrutiny also is required here because of the vehicle of regulation chosen by the Department-compelled disclosure which
implicates First Amendment rights.25

The decision in Surinach should have substantial impact in instances where the state asserts authority to control the financial
affairs of a church and demands carte blanche to obtain financial
20.
21.
North
(1980).
22.
23.
24.
25.

U.S. Dept. of Labor, Unemployment Insurance ProgramLetter No. 39-78.
Valente v. Larsen, No. 4-78-453 (D. Minn. 1979); Heritage Village Church v.
Carolina, 40 N.C.App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1979), affd, 48 U.S.L.W. 2640
Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id. at 79 (citations omitted).

records. The court warned that compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing upon the exercise of first
amendment rights. The court also stated that when there is compelled disclosure, such state action can not be justified by a mere
showing of some legitimate governmental interest but that "the
subordinating interest of the State must survive exacting scru26
tiny."
Thus, the Sherbert test has been applied to the individual
claims under the Free Exercise Clause and to church institutional
claims of government encroachment into church affairs.

IV. DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CASES ARISING UNDER
RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
When the state infringes upon rights arising under the religious
clauses of the first amendment, a question arises regarding the
standard of proof constitutionally required for the state to prove
the existence of a compelling state interest and that the actions of
the state are the least intrusive alternative. While the Supreme
Court has held that the due process required by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments means that certain procedural protections must be granted to persons who may, in a non-criminal case,
suffer a loss of either liberty or property interest which is within
the ambit of the fifth or fourteenth amendment, the Court has
never specified the particular standard of proof constitutionally
required before the state can deprive an individual of such interests. It is submitted that the first and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution require clear and convincing proof
from the government that a compelling state interest exists and
that the governmental action is the least intrusive alternative
available.

V. DUE PROCESS ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Several Supreme Court decisions 27 have provided an analytical
framework for ascertaining the procedural protections necessary
where the loss of a liberty or property interest is threatened. In
its analysis of whether any due process protection is required, the
Court has utilized a two-step process of reasoning. First, it must
initially be determined whether a protectable interest exists and
whether the individual will suffer a "grievous loss" to an interest
26. Id.
27. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). (Morrissey was explicit in its use
of this framework).
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"within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of
the fourteenth amendment." 28 If such an interest is involved, the
Court proceeds to the second stage of the analysis and considers
which procedural protections are required. This involves the determination "of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." 29 The procedure chosen should reflect a
balance of these factors to insure that "fundamental fairness" is
achieved.
In determining whether procedural due process is required, the
Court in Board of Regents v. Roth30 stated that "we must look not
to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake. We must
look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property."3 1 The first amendment's guarantees concerning religion are clearly within the protection provided by the fourteenth amendment, since the Due Process
Clause has been held to protect the rights to the free exercise of
religion 32 and the non-establishment of religion.33 Indeed, the
Court in Roth, quoting a lengthy list of freedoms enumerated in
Meyer v. Nebraska,34 specifically included an individual's freedom
"to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience"
as within the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment. 35
Because deprivation of one's first amendment rights triggers an
individual's entitlement to due process, it becomes necessary to
determine which specific procedures are required by the right.
The decision regarding the necessary standard of proof should reflect the nature of the liberty interest which is subject to deprivation, as well as the interest of the state and others who may be
involved.
The Supreme Court recently discussed the function of a standard of proof in Addington v. Texas:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the
Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the fact
28. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972)).
29. 408 U.S. at 481.
30. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
31. 408 U.S. at 471 (citations omitted). In Roth the Supreme Court made clear
that it is improper to rely upon balancing to decide whether the right is applicable.
32. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
34. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1921).
35. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.

finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and
36 to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
decision.
In addressing the question of the applicable standard of proof
in a particular proceeding, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court,37 noted that the allocation and degree of burden of proof is determined by the
nature of the rights implicated in the lawsuit. He quoted Speiser
v. Randall, in which first amendment rights were at issue:
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has
at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant (sic]
his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof
in the first instance, and of persuading in the factflnder at the conclusion
of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has
borne the burden
of producing the evidence and convincing the factflnder
38
of his guilt.

VI.

THE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF" STANDARD

In general, the required standard of proof in civil litigation is a
mere preponderance of the evidence. Since civil cases typically
involve disputes between private parties, the preponderance standard is appropriate because "society has a minimal concern with
the outcome of such private suits, ... "39
Yet for certain issues courts have required a higher degree of
proof than a preponderance of the evidence--clear and convincing
proof. This is a standard used in unusual civil cases where, for
exceptional reasons-such as the difficulty of proof of an issue or
a reason to be distrustful of a particular party-a higher standard
than normally imposed is required.4 0
VII. "CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF" AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES

In addition to the above situations, this more demanding stan36. 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citations omitted).
37. 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
38. Id. at 362. (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting from Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
39. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423.
40. "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which
will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the
allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere
preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120
N.E.2d 118, 123 (1954), footnoted in Hobson v. Eaton, 339 F.2d 781, 784 (6th Cir.
1968).
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dard has also been imposed in situations where the various interests of society are pitted against restrictions on the liberty of the
individual. The Supreme Court has used this standard of proof
"to protect particularly important individual interests in various
civil cases." 41
A.

Denaturalization,Expatriation,and Deportation

The Supreme Court has held that in denaturalization, expatriation, and deportation hearings in the area of citizenship and immigration, the government must prove its allegations by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.4 2 In the first of these decisions, involving denaturalization, the Court explained its reasoning, stating that "rights once conferred should not be lightly
revoked. And more especially is this true when the rights are precious and when they are conferred by solemn adjudication, as is
43
the situation where citizenship is granted."
In a later decision involving the deportation of aliens, the Court
rejected the contention that because such proceedings are civil,
"a person may be banished from this country upon no higher degree of proof than applies to a negligence case." 44 In light of the
"drastic deprivations" that may follow a deportation, the Court
held the higher standard of clear, unequivocal, and convincing
45
proof to be necessary.
B. Civil Commitment
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court has held that a clear
and convincing standard of proof is required by the fourteenth
amendment in a civil proceeding brought under state law to involuntarily commit an individual to a state mental hospital for an indefinite period. 46 Such a standard was required because the
individual's liberty interest in the outcome of a civil commitment
proceeding is of greater weight and gravity than the state's interest in providing care to its citizens with emotional disorders and
41. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 453.
42. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (expatriation); Schneidermann v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (denaturalization).
43. Schneidermann v. United States, 320 U.S. at 125.
44. Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
45. Id.
46. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423.

in protecting the community from potentially dangerous mentally
ill persons. The Court noted that the "individual should not be
asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state."47 It recognized that in cases involving
individual rights, the standard of proof reflects the value society
places on individual liberty, regardless of whether a case is crimi48
nal or civil.
C. Equal Protectionand Racial Discrimination
The principle is well-established that where a history of racial
discrimination is shown to exist, the burden of showing nondiscrimination in particular situations shifts to the party having the
power to produce the facts. 49 In two critical areas, public education and private employment, courts have held that this burden of
showing nondiscrimination can only be met by the presentation
of "clear and convincing evidence."
For example, when a plaintiff alleges that conduct of a school
system is racially-motivated, a prima facie case of violation of
substantive constitutional rights under the equal protection
clause is shown if the system has a history of racial discrimination. The burden then shifts to the school authorities, who must
rebut the prima facie case by showing by clear and convincing evidence that permissible, racially neutral criteria governed their
50
conduct.
Likewise, numerous cases which have dealt with the issue of racial discrimination in private employment have established that a
prima facie showing of past discrimination shifts the burden to
the employer to prove that a particular person or class of persons
would have been denied the contested job, promotion, transfer,
etc., absent racial discrimination. "And those courts which have
given the most careful consideration to the burden of proof ques47. Id. at 427.
48. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has required the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in such cases. See In re Ballay,
482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. See Rolfe v. County Board of Education of Lincoln County, Tennessee, 391
F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Chambers v. Hendersonville Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th
Cir. 1966).
50. See generally Keyes v. Denver School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Reynolds v.
Abbeville County School Dist., 554 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Jones County
School Dist., 544 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 528 F.2d
414 (4th Cir. 1975); Alexander v. Warren School Dist., 464 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1972);
Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966); Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 329 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Williams v.
Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. (W.D. La. 1969).
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tion have held that the employee must prevail unless the employer proves its case by clear and convincing evidence." 5'
D. FirstAmendment Rights
The clear and convincing standard is not foreign to cases concerned with first amendment liberties. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,52 a plurality of the Supreme Court held that proof of
libel required clear and convincing evidence due to the important
first amendment issues involved. It found that an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff in a libel case was most serious because the
possibility of such an error "would create a strong impetus toward
53
self-censorship which the First Amendment cannot tolerate."
The Court concluded that the safeguarding of important first
amendment rights necessitated a more rigorous standard of proof:
We thus hold that a libel action by a private individual against a licensed
radio station for a defamatory falsehood in a newscast relating to his involvement in an event of public or general concern may be sustained only
upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge
that it was false with reckless disregard of whether
54
it was false or not.

This holding in Rosenbloom was consistent with the earlier
Supreme Court case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.55 In the
New York Times case, the Court, concerned with the defamation
of a public figure, found that the proof presented to show actual
malice lacked "the convincing clarity which the constitutional
56
standard demands."
In his concurring opinion in a decision which found an Alabama
law on obscenity to be facially unconstitutional in both civil and
criminal aspects, Justice Brennan argues that the hazards to first
amendment freedoms inherent in the regulation of obscenity necessitate that the state comply with the most demanding standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil proceeding. "Inher51. Day v. Matthews, 530 F. 2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Seven-Up
Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 561 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1977); Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211
(5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1974); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972).
52. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. Id. at 285.

ent in all factfinding procedures is the potential for erroneous
judgments and, when First Amendment values are implicated, the
selection of the standard of proof of necessity implicates the rela57
Justive constitutional acceptability of erroneous judgments."
tice Brennan found that inherent in the increased likelihood of
error resulting from a preponderance of the evidence standard
are the dangers of "the likelihood of self-censorship and the erroneous proscription of constitutionally protected material."5 8 Such
dangers are just as likely in civil as in criminal regulation, and the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is thus necessary to reduce the hazards to first amendment freedoms to a tolerable
59
level.
It can be readily seen that clear and convincing proof is the
standard required to sustain claims which have serious consequences or harsh or far-reaching effects. 60 In institutional free exercise of religion cases, when the Court is dealing with the
weighing of evidence submitted by the government to sustain its
burdens of proof under the Sherbert test, no quantum of proof is
appropriate other than the clear and convincing standard. This is
because the Court is dealing with a claim which holds a preferred
position and has far-reaching social consequences. It is the only
standard that fits the requirements of close scrutiny mandated by
the religion clauses of the first amendment.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In a case involving either government infringement of free exercise rights or state intrusion into church institutional concerns, a
heavy burden of proof falls upon the government to establish the
existence of a compelling state interest and the absence of any
less violative method of attaining the government's objectives.
It is clear that the government cannot meet the burden imposed
upon it by Sherbert by simply asserting the existence of some
generally recognized interest which the state has over the subject
matter. As Professor Tribe has stated:
In applying the least intrusive alternative-compelling interest requirement, it is crucial to avoid the error of equating the state's interest in denying an exemption with the state's usually much greater interest in
maintaining the underlying rule or program for unexceptional cases. Only
the first interest-that in denying 6an1 exemption-is constitutionally relevant when an exemption is sought.

The courts have not yet discussed the degree of proof which is
57. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 684 (1976)

(Brennan, J., concurring).

58. Id. at 687.

59. Id.
60. United States v. Bridges, 133 F. Supp. 638, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
61. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTINrrIONAL LAw 855 (1978).
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required in applying the Sherbert test. It is submitted, however,
that only the clear and convincing standard is suitable for permitting the infringement or intrusion by the state into religious matters protected by the religion clauses of the first amendment.
This degree of proof should be unequivocally required of the
government whenever it seeks to thrust the power of the state
into this sensitive and delicate area of constitutional concern.
Government should not be permitted to enter this sacred domain
without the same type of showing required when other precious
rights are at stake.
The application of the Sherbert test, coupled with a high standard of proof, is the best protection against a government that,
from time to time, may lose sight of the fact that its most compelling governmental concern should be to insure the protection of
those rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

